Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene A Muslim’s perspective by Alkatiri, Wardah
116
The Religious and Ethnic Future of Europe
Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis, 28 (2018), pp. 116–158
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene
A Muslim’s perspective
WARDAH ALKATIRI
This article presents the nature of conflicts in postcolonial societies as the consequence of being under external control and economic exploitation. Drawing on empirical cases from Indonesia 
and a comparative literature review of African states, this article reveals a huge dilemma within the 
desire to build a solid nation state in a deeply pluralistic society. The nature of the modern nation 
state, which from the start requires the forcible subjugation of the population, has become one of 
the greatest paradoxes. That is to say, the very idea of unity for the pursuance of equity contradicts 
the premise of democracy, because forcing unity onto diversity implies denouncing differences 
and thus violating universal individual rights to be different. On that account, Indonesia’s struggle 
with diversity has falsified Huntington’s thesis, according to which cultural differences necessarily 
tend to lead to conflict. On the contrary, Indonesia demonstrates that conflicts have stemmed from 
nationalism and political-economic ideologies rather than cultural differences. This article high-
lights two issues of global relevance. Firstly, the inherent problems of coexistence that arise from 
the legacy of the Christian missionary tradition advocating the separation of the state and religion 
in the colonies, whereas Islam is a religion of politics and of law. Secondly, the concept of al-din is 
hardly compatible with the Western concept of religion. In contemporary globalization, the modern 
nation state and nationalism are increasingly contrasted with the ‘cosmic’ nature of religion, which 
claims allegiances transcending differences of race and nationality. On the bright side, a case study 
of a Muslim ‘intentional community’ offers a pragmatic solution whereby an implementation of 
Islamic jurisprudence as a response to ecological issues by an individual Muslim group is doable 
within the constraints of a nation state. Thus the thesis moves beyond the rigidity of state system 
and promotes a ‘people to people’ approach. 
Introduction
What I am presenting in this article is a serendipitous finding within 
my doctoral research (Alkatiri 2016). It was an interdisciplinary work on 
environmental studies and development studies with a close examination 
of nationalism and post-colonial issues alongside ethnic and religious con-
flicts, globalization issues and Islamic movements in Indonesian society. 
Broadly, my thesis contends with the problem of  sustainability and envi-
ronmental degradation against two main challenges. On the one hand is the 
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economic-growth paradigm and the concomitant consumption levels of the 
consumer-capitalist societies which have now become a global phenomenon, 
including in developing countries like Indonesia. On the other hand there 
are the poverty and development projects taking place in underdeveloped 
and developing countries. Both imply an exploitation of nat ural resources. 
Historicizing the social construction of insensitive attitudes towards the 
environment among either policy or opinion makers required me to look 
into the education system and an investigation of the symbolic function of 
nationalism as a source of ideas and meaning. 
Nationalism can be a powerful force for good. It evidently underpinned 
a vibrant movement for independence from colonial rule. It was also used 
as instrument for social and political control in attempts to unify all of a 
nation’s potential towards development programmes. However, an educa-
tion imbued with nationalism and developmentalism may have become the 
main culprit in cultivating sustainability ‘illiteracy’. All nations are exclusive 
projects with respect to who they are not, so cultivating a desire for competi-
tion in progress and economic growth1 hinders students’ self-reflection and 
the conscience needed to comprehend sustainability in the context of a finite 
earth. It inhibits the ‘whole-earth, one-world family’ vision and the spirit 
of global cooperation which is needed to tackle the ecological crises which 
have reached a global scale. Moreover, the combined power of nationalism, 
science, technology, economic growth and modernization may well be the 
case that has overshadowed traditional connections to nature which are to 
be found in the religions. With a pragmatic research paradigm that aims to 
seek solutions, I was inspired by the networks of local sustainable commu-
nity in the ‘relocalisation’2 literature, namely the Global Ecovillage Network 
1 Under the capitalist-development paradigm, education induces acquisitive mater-
ialism and carries the promise of material happiness that entails lust and a sense 
of greed which results in ever greater demands upon the environment. For more, 
see Orr 1991 and Trainer 2012.
2 ‘Relocalisation’ aims to reweave the fabric of communities, rebuilding them 
into sustainable, largely self-sufficient communities, and establishing local self-
govern ance. As the effects of economic policies that ignore the needs of people 
and the planet become blindingly obvious, in post-industrial societies there are 
groups of people trying to create what they believe would be a sustainable and 
just society. They often aim to achieve this by turning to the local economy, put-
ting the means of production under social control (instead of market forces and 
profit), and instituting self-governance. These movements try to create room for 
social, ecological and spiritual values (Norberg 2002, Dawson 2006). 
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(2017) and the Transition Network (2017), and I turned my research focus 
to an investigation of the potential of Muslim groups and their learning 
communities to advance similar movements grounded in ‘Islamic envi-
ronmentalism’, discussed by Richard Foltz et al. (2003), Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr (1996), Tony Watling (2009), David Johnston (2010), and others. By 
doing so, the research was pragmatically looking for an alternative model 
for an environmental movement that potentially has more chance of being 
heeded by a wider reach of the population in Muslim-majority countries 
like Indonesia, and has the potential to be networked globally as well, given 
that ‘religions are the largest NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in 
the world’ (Grim and Tucker 2014). 
Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population. Despite being a 
majority in quantity, it is worth highlighting that Muslims in Indonesia 
have been marginalized in terms of political access and economic prosper-
ity. This predicament has historic roots. The Dutch colonial government did 
not deliver widespread educational opportunities to others besides classes 
of indigenous peoples loyal to it (Ricklefs et al. 2010, Pringle 2010). Ewout 
Frankema (2014: 2) argues that this inequality was a consequence of the 
Dutch metropolitan commitment to secular rule in an overwhelmingly 
Massive Friday prayer in ‘anti-blasphemy against Islam’ rally, Jakarta, 2.12.2016.. ANTARA 
FOTO/Hermanus Prihatna.
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Islamic society. Consequently, following independence, when the develop-
ment programme began, the majority of Muslims were ‘uneducated’ in the 
modern sense of the term and therefore, unable to supply manpower to meet 
the demand for ‘qualified’ human resources to participate. Henceforth, the 
political and economic arena was dominated by actors who came from sec-
ular-nationalist, Christian and socialist backgrounds. They were even hold-
ing important positions within the circles of Suharto’s New Order elites, 
and hence the Muslim circles came to the conclusion that the government 
had been hijacked by anti-Muslim alliances of Chinese, Catholics, former 
socialists, and armed officers. This situation led to a psychology of ‘defeat’, 
where, as a majority, they had to face the reality that in fact they were weak 
in power. They were  a majority in numbers, but a minority in quality. Hence, 
the Muslim majority turned out to be a minority in mentality (Hasbullah 
2002), as implied by Adam Schwarz (1997: 129): ‘Muslim leaders often 
sound and act like members of a persecuted minority’, which is clearly an 
anomaly. Despite these facts, my research finding reveals the present-day 
largest homegrown Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, has rejected the 
idea of an Islamic environmental movement with a ‘relocalisation’ approach, 
as mentioned above, due to, especially, the notion of self-governance which 
might have appeared to the top-level leadership of the organization, which 
engages closely with the Indonesian central government, to be inciting 
secession and promoting an antithesis to the ideal of the unity of the NKRI 
(the Negara Kesatuan Republic of Indonesia) nation state. Indeed, an inves-
tigation of the potential of Muslim groups to advance ‘relocalisation’ must 
be confronted with the reality of religious conflicts that have nowadays 
become more frequent. The most recent one erupted with the nomination of 
a Chinese and Christian governor candidate for the capital, Jakarta.3
Many have written on the rise of conflicts motivated by religion and 
ethnicity in all quarters of the globe. Amy Chua (2004) shows that it is 
free-market democracy that has triggered ethnic violence in Southeast Asia, 
the former Yugoslavia, Latin America, South Africa, East Africa, West 
Africa and post-communist Russia. Apart from political-economic issues, 
my investigation of Indonesia’s national history has uncovered a ‘social con-
struction of intolerance’ alongside firstly, a ‘violent’ passion for nationalism, 
3 See, for example Cochrane 2016, Jensen and Nangoy 2017, Vatican Radio 2017.
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and secondly, a ‘violent’ passion for the separation of religion and politics. In 
fact, this recalls Max Weber’s classic definition of the modern state:
The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domina-
tion. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use 
of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. (Weber 
1921: 5)
It also recalls Karen Armstrong’s Fields of Blood (2014) in which she 
reminds us not to point our fingers only at religion and fail to remember the 
nationalistic motives underlying violence in Europe and older civilizations. 
The explanation for this follows.
There have been ongoing debates in the last few decades that the experi-
ence of modernity has not been the same for the West as for the rest of 
the world. For colonized societies, modernity – which was once a largely 
descriptive account of the social and cognitive transformations that first 
occurred in the West – came to be regarded as a largely ‘normative account’ 
(Featherstone 1991: 6), hence, the imperative of colonized societies to follow 
modernization at the expense of the conditions in local contexts. This article 
shows further that neither does the experience of Western democracy apply 
similarly in the multi-ethnic colonized societies as in the West. It isn’t until 
we arrive at post-modernity that such a critique of modern ideas is possible. 
Postmodernism runs counter to modernism, which adheres to a realist 
doctrine. While modernism is characterized by an acceptance that general 
laws and truths may be attained by way of reason, science, and technology, 
and thus progress is possible, postmodernism in many ways opposes such 
ideas. Postmodernism only accepts the relative as a meaningful category, 
banning the very category of truth from intellectual discourse, and thus, it 
rejects the idea of progress itself in favour of local, unique, personal, context-
ualized ‘truths’. From that perspective, the rise of conflicts in multi-ethnic 
societies in post-colonial countries substantiates the inadequacy of the mod-
ern nation-state model and nation building as a means to achieve equality 
and social justice. This article presents African states and Indonesia as cases 
in point.
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Desperately seeking unity
Despite the heavy centralization of nation-building processes that the 
African states have undertaken, Solomon Dersso (2012) writes elaborately 
on how ethnically-based claims for substantive equality, justice, and equit-
able political inclusion and socio-economic order continue to result in com-
munal rivalries in Africa. In his analysis, Dersso examines the nature of the 
basic structure of the post-colonial African states as it was inherited from 
the colonial states. He seeks to explain why most African states have failed 
to gain the approval of members of all the constituent ethno-cultural groups. 
He further examines why the nation-building process has engendered con-
flicts, instead of serving as a basis for social co-operation and national inte-
gration. A correspondence between the experiences of the African states and 
that of Indonesia is presented in the rest of the article with the following 
summary in a nutshell:
1) Ethno-cultural diversity in Africa is comparable to religious diversity in 
Indonesia.
2) The issue of ‘tribal remains’ of the primitive past as the main targets 
of nation-building projects in Africa is comparable to Islam being the 
main target of the nation-building project in Indonesia through secu-
larization of the religion. 
Furthermore, alongside Dersso (2012) in Africa, Hikmat  (2014) pre-
sents historical records of the Indonesian government’s policies on religion 
and culture which are used to explain the epistemological background of 
the social construction of ‘intolerance’ in the society at large. Thus, while 
in Africa ‘the separation of state and ethnicity’ as Will Kymlicka (1995: 4) 
puts it, ‘precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups or 
any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties’ 
(Dersso 2012: 82), this article highlights the historical events of suppression 
of political Islam in Indonesia, in favour of ‘the separation of the state and 




The legacy of the missionaries
Secularism as a notion denoting the separation of religion and the state 
emerged in pre-colonial and pre-capitalist Europe as a protest movement 
for individual freedom against a theocratic state. However, as capitalism and 
trade progressively expanded, it was largely the bourgeoisie and merchant 
capitalists who championed secularism and henceforth, secularism evolved 
to be primarily an offshoot of market morality: 
It was premised on the necessity of individual freedom required for 
manoeuvre in the market, that would not be hampered by one’s reli-
gion, nor would religion obstruct the functioning of the market  
(Roy 2006: 158).
What is interesting is that secularism in the European colonies was 
propagated by the Christian missionary to inculcate loyalty to colonial 
administrations in the local populations (Barnett 2011). Colonialism was 
central to the spread of Christianity; ‘the native populations were defined 
by what they lacked – beginning with Jesus Christ and continuing through 
a long list of items that they associated with the civilized, Christian West’ 
such as hygiene, self-control and discipline, chastity, sobriety, and hard work, 
which were viewed as essential for a Christian character’ (Barnett 2011: 67). 
Colonial administrators and foreign trades found such missionary projects 
highly desirable, because if successful, the local populations would become 
more compliant, easier to control, and develop tastes and values that were 
consistent with the interests of the West. To the missionaries, colonial 
power makes possible a Christian world order by providing unprecedented 
opportun ities for spreading ‘the word’. Hence, colonialism was good for 
Christianity, and Christianity was good for colonialism. Consequently, vari-
ous rules were set up to avoid conflict and to teach the local populations to 
respect colonial administrations. Following the maxim of ‘rendering unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s’ 
(Matthew 22:21), the missionaries attempted to maintain a line between 
themselves and pol itics: ‘Matters of governance were the domain of the 
state, matters of religion were the domain of the church, and both the gov-
ernment and the church needed to recognize each other’s sphere of author-
ity’ (Barnett 2011: 72). 
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Against that background of a ‘missionaries–colonial government’ alliance, 
my article offers a sociological explanation for the rising tensions between 
Indonesian Muslim and Christian groups in present-day Indonesia. From 
that vantage point, a thesis of Indonesian religious conflicts can be sug-
gested in contrast to the received wisdom. Instead of religion being the main 
obstacle to the attainment of a peaceful society, it is the concept of the mod-
ern nation state and its state-centric nation-building process that should be 
held responsible for the development of intolerant attitudes in society.
The imperative of nation building
One of the most arduous tasks that post-colonial states were faced with 
at the time of independence was how to address the demands of their diverse 
communities who were incorporated – often by force – into large nation 
states under arbitrarily contrived colonial boundaries and structures (Bodley 
1990, S. V. R. Nasr 2001, Ricklefs et al. 2010, Pringle 2010, Dersso 2012). As 
for Indonesia, when independence was finally achieved, the people were not 
sure who they were – whether they belonged to their regional (Southeast 
Asian), or ethnic, or religious, or ideological identities. It was pretty much 
the same with the Africans, as Dersso explains:
What made this problem particularly formidable is that almost all 
African states, as the product of the colonial process and its system 
of divide and rule, lack national cohesion. Not only did their popula-
tions lack any shared consciousness of belonging to one country, but 
they were also ethno-culturally divided and socio-economically and 
politically unequal. The fragility of the post-colonial states was further 
compounded by the weak institutional foundation and capacity of the 
independent governments (Rothchild & Olorunsola 1983), a situation 
exacerbated by extremely underdeveloped and fragmented economies 
(Nwabueze 1973). (Dersso 2012: 61–2)
Given that, nation building became the most plausible top priority on 
the agenda of the post-colonial states. Dersso (2012: 62) notes that the 
independent governments had two options. The first was based on the dom-
inant model of the nation state that had been popular at that time. The 
other was what may be referred to as a ‘multicultural model’ of nation build-
ing ex emplified by Switzerland and India. However, given the following 
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conditions and arguments concerning Africa (ibid. 65), the wholesale adop-
tion of the dominant model of nation state was chosen by all African states: 
1) There was deep ethno-cultural division in the population.
2) There was a lack of shared political history among diverse ethnicities.
3) It was widely held at that time that African ethnicity, dubbed as tribal-
ism, was an impediment to modernization and national unity.
Against that background, African post-colonial states undertook the 
‘assimilationist’ and ‘integrationist’ approach of state-centered nation-build-
ing processes. For the particular context of Africa – which I argue to be 
comparable with Indonesia – the following political paradigms were domin-
ant in the newly-born states.
Firstly, the possession of a single, homogenous, national identity was 
seen as a condition necessary to the generation of the ‘sense of common 
purpose’ required for democratic government. Dersso notes further:
For influential 19th-century liberals such as John Stuart Mill, a demo-
cratic system of government is possible only where the people of a 
country share a common sense of nationhood. Mill put it thus: ‘Free 
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they 
read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary 
to the working of representative government, cannot exist’. According 
to him, therefore, it is ‘a necessary condition of free institutions that the 
boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of 
nationalities’. (Dersso 2012: 63)
Along this line, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who 
strongly influenced the French Revolution and whose ideas have been 
powerful forces in the creation of nationalism within and outside Europe, 
expounded a more powerful argument on the need for homogeneity. It is 
believed that homogeneity is a necessary condition for popular sovereignty, 
or the ‘general will’, which is the basis for the legitimacy of the modern 
nation state. According to Rousseau, it will be difficult to form a ‘general will’ 
in a society where ‘factions arise and partial associations are formed’. Thus, 
he saw the cohesion and homogeneity of citizens as a necessary condition 
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for the formation of the ‘general will’ as an expression of popular sovereignty. 
He puts it thus:
The more concert reigns in the assemblies, that is, the nearer opinion 
approaches unanimity, the greater is the dominance of the general will. 
On the other hand, long debates, dissensions and tumult proclaim 
the ascendancy of particular interests and the decline of the State. 
(Rousseau 1762: 83)
Rousseau even went as far as saying that a state needs a ‘religion’. That is, 
‘the religion of the citizen’, which is:
codified in a single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary patrons; 
it has its dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law; out-
side the single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel, 
foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only 
as far as its own altars. … [M]aking country the object of the citizens’ 
adoration, teaches them that service done to the State is service done to 
its tutelary god. … To die for one’s country then becomes martyrdom; 
violation of its laws, impiety; and to subject one who is guilty to public 
execration is to condemn him to the anger of the gods: Sacer estod. 
(Rousseau 1762: 107)
Dersso comments that Rousseau’s paradigm favours not only a majoritar-
ian system of government but insists on the necessity for a state of achieving 
socio-cultural and linguistic homogeneity. In France, it offered the philo-
sophical basis for the pursuance of a homogenizing nation-building process 
that turned peasants and distinct communities in the country into ‘French 
men and women’ (Dersso 2012: 64), but apparently, in post-colonial states it 
did not work that well. 
Secondly, for the unity and political stability of a modern constitutional 
state, the possession of a commonly ‘shared identity’ by a state and its nation-
als was seen to be necessary. Thus a ’nation’ was needed as the basis of the 
state. This is because, as Ernest Barker argued:
There must be a general social cohesion which serves, as it were, as a 
matrix, before the seal of legal association can be effectively imposed 
on a population. If the seal of the State is stamped on a population 
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which is not held together in the matrix of a common tradition and 
sentiment, there is likely to be a cracking and splitting, as there was in 
Austria-Hungary. (Barker 1951: 42)
Thirdly, the nation state serves the functional requirement of the modern 
society. Gellner (1983) argues that the modern state requires a culturally 
homogenous society for its effective running, given that members of society 
must conduct transactions with each other, run the bureaucracy, operate the 
same court system and the like. Consequently, it necessitates a standardized 
language and common cultural attributes and historical symbols which are 
shared by all the people. Thus, Taylor (1998) noted further, that the consti-
tutional state must enforce a kind of homogeneity of language and culture 
through the education system as well as media.
With the above-mentioned rationales, the nation-state model appeared 
to be the only legitimate form of political organization, and henceforth, in 
nearly all post-colonial African states:
The imperative of nation-building. Flags at the ONU Building, Geneva, 25.2.2005. Photo by 
Yann, Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA 3.0.
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1) National unity was pursued through homogenization. National unity in 
terms of homogeneity and unity was praised highly, whereas an ethno-
cultural diversity was seen as a weakness and antithetical to the process 
of nation building.
2) Heavy centralization and restrictions of political and ethno-cultural 
plur alism were prevalent. The constitutions, laws and development poli-
cies of these states have all been used as instruments in a highly central-
ized, unitarist and homogenizing nation-building process. The former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed: ‘too often, the necessity of 
building national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of 
political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism’ 
(Annan 1998).
These paradigms were fully appropriated by the African elites. Francis 
Deng notes:
After independence Africans were eager to disavow tribalism as 
divisive. Unity was postulated in a way that assumed a mythical 
homogeneity amidst diversity. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana outlawed 
parties organized on tribal or ethnic bases. Houphouet-Boigny of 
Cote d’Ivoire coopted ethnic groups through shrewd distribution of 
minister ial posts, civil service jobs, social services, and development 
projects. Julius Nyerere, a scion of tribal chieftaincy, stamped out tribal-
ism by fostering nationalistic pride in Tanganyika and later, Tanzania, 
born out of the union with Zanzibar. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya forged a 
delicate alliance of ethnic groups behind the dominance of his Kenyan 
African National Union party. (Deng 1997: 28–9)
In comparison, the following section highlights a similar nation-build-
ing process in Indonesia. 
Separating the state and religion
From the sixteenth century onwards, the history of Southeast Asia has 
been marked by colonial aggression and exploitation carried out by almost 
all the great imperial powers (United Kingdom, France, Holland, Portugal, 
Spain and the USA). Indonesia was a Dutch colony. It was formed from the 
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nationalized colony of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie, VOC), which came under the administration of the 
Dutch government in 1800. Most Indonesians believe that they were under 
the Dutch for nearly 350 years with the arrival of the VOC in 1609 as 
its starting point. The archipelago was one of the most valuable European 
colonies and contributed to the Dutch’s prominence in spice and cash crops 
trades. Even if some would disagree with the association of the Christian 
missionary activities as part and parcel of Western colonialism, historically 
it is true that much of Christian missionary activity happened during the 
heyday of the colonial enterprise (Evers 2014). To deal with the plurality 
of the populations in the archipelago, a politics of segregation was imposed. 
Hikmat Budiman (2014) highlights the historical events in pre-independ-
ence Indonesia which I argue have contributed to the social construction of 
intolerance by engendering vigilance against difference. 
The colonial government divided the population into groups that were 
strictly monitored and was extremely discriminatory. The Dutch colonial 
law known as the Algemene Baplingen van Wetgeving (General Regulation 
on Legislature Principles) divided the population of the East Indies into 
two categories based on religious orientations, namely, Europeans who 
embraced Christianity; and natives, for that of all non-Europeans. In 1885, 
the colonial government divided the population, not based on religion but on 
race, into three groups: European, In-lander, and Foreign Orientals (Indian, 
Arab, Chinese). Perhaps at the missionaries’ request, the colonial power in 
general (Barnett 2011),4 and the Dutch in Indonesia (Pringle 2010: 47–9), 
were particularly hostile to Islam. 
On 17 August 1945, Indonesia proclaimed its independence. The archi-
pelago became a country of cultural diversity. Migration, trade, coloniza-
tion, diffusion and adaptation have given rise to some 300 ethnic or cultural 
groups. The country consists of a large archipelago of more than 17,000 
4 The World Missionary Conference (WMC) in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1910, 
‘was particularly worried about “Mohammedism,” as missionaries reported their 
lack of acceptance in Islamic societies and noted that Christianity was losing 
ground to Islam for the souls of non-monotheistic peoples in places like sub-
Saharan Africa. Registering alarm and anxiety, the conference highlighted the 
urgent need to confront Islam, limit its gains, and, if at all possible, send it back 
to Arabia’ (Barnett 2011: 70–1). The conference was attended by some of the 
period’s most important religious, political, and economic figures.
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islands straddling the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The largest islands 
are Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Papua (formerly Irian, which 
is the western part of New Guinea). Indonesia’s total land area measures 1.9 
million square kilometres (750,000 square miles). This is three times the area 
of Texas, almost eight times the area of the United Kingdom and roughly 
fifty times the area of the Netherlands. Apart from fertile land suitable for 
agriculture, at the time of its independence in 1945, Indonesia was rich in 
a range of natural resources, ranging from petroleum, natural gas, and coal, 
to metals such as tin, bauxite, nickel, copper, gold, and silver. It is important 
to note that the country has also been characterized by cohabitation of both 
Muslims as the majority (slightly more than 87 % in 2009) and Christians 
(less than 10 % in 2009), together with two other significant minorities, 
that is Hindus (2 %) and Buddhists (1 %). Both Indonesian Muslims and 
Christians equally claimed a role in the nation building. Notably, each one’s 
version was at odds with the other’s. 
Forcing unity onto diversity
After independence, the multicultural setting and all kinds of diversity 
were seen as a threat to national stability. Sukarno, the first President of 
Indonesia, seemed to be preoccupied by the idea of ‘nationhood’ and came 
up with the notions of Natie and Nationale Staat, according to which the
nation of Indonesia embraces entire individuals who according to the 
geopolitics decreed by Allah coexists in the union of all islands across 
Indonesia from the Northern tip of Sumatera to the farthest end of 
Irian (Budiman 2014: 192). 
By referring to the decree of God, Sukarno strove to formulate, in his 
passion for unity, a platform that could mediate the pre-Indonesian nation. 
In fact, his reflection invoked what Deng observed of the African states 
already mentioned: ‘unity was postulated in a way that assumed a mythical 
homogeneity amidst diversity’ (Deng 1997: 28).
It is interesting to note that Sukarno’s doctrine of Natie and Nationale 
Staat might appear to be the veracities of Benedict Anderson’s (1983) 
im agined community in the literal sense of the term. This too, should invoke 
Ernest Renan (1882: 892) who said that ‘nationalism is not the awakening 
of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist’. 
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Towards that end, Sukarno established Pancasila5 (Sanskrit ‘five principles’) 
as a state ideology that was hoped to become a foundation for national 
identity. It was hoped that it would be a guide in creating a harmonious 
society based on religious tolerance, humanism, nationalism, democracy and 
social justice. Pancasila seemed to be prescribed to serve the function of a 
‘religion of the citizen’ as conceptualized by Rousseau (1762). Subsequently, 
as in post-colonial India (Roy 2006), the secularism adopted by Indonesia 
acquired a changed meaning; namely all religions should be treated equally 
under the dictate of nationalism. 
Nationalism was the dominant force of Sukarno’s regime with Sukarno 
as its chief commander. In 1957 Sukarno declared the institution of Guided 
Democracy, a non-system of personal, authoritarian rule. He assumed, 
and many Indonesians agreed, that he alone could achieve national unity 
(Pringle 2010: 67). Thus, his famous statement:
I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies.  
I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became 
the present Sukarno (Latif 2008: 306).
In the same vein, the following remarks of African leaders are worth 
noting: 
In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or reli-
gious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our 
country and its population (Touré 1959: 34).
We must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, 
there should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, 
‘strangers’, and so forth, but that we should call ourselves Ghanaians – 
all brothers and sisters, members of the same community – the state of 
Ghana (Nkrumah 1961: 168).
5 The five principles of Pancasila are: 1) belief in one supreme God; 2) a just  
and civilized humanity; 3) national unity; 4) Indonesian-style democracy; and  
5) social justice.
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Nevertheless, Sukarno was fully aware of the incompatibility between 
Islam and the idea of a nation state. In one of his speeches, he rhetorically 
asked:
… can the Nationalist movement be joined with the Islamic move-
ment, which essentially denies the nation? … With full conviction,  
I answer: ‘Yes!’ (Sukarno 1970: 38–9, in Burhanudin and Dijk 2013)
It is worth mentioning, like the other infant post-colonial states, the 
history of the new Indonesian Republic was replete with civil war, social 
upheaval and horrific events. One of the five most significant is the Darul 
Islam uprising (1948–62). The Darul Islam rebellion proved that some 
Muslims put religion before national unity. It is worth noticing that 
Hidayatullah, the subject of the case study in section ‘The khilafah reinter-
preted’ is allegedly associated with the Darul Islam rebellion. On account of 
the tension between Islam and the state, the Sukarno government banned 
and eliminated Islamic political power and in the 1960s also began to restrict 
the political activities of Muslim politicians (Hasbullah 2002). Many activ-
ists were put into jail. People became aware that his Guided Democracy 
was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown (Noer 1987: 415, in 
Hasbullah 2002: 7). Moeflich Hasbullah notes further that Muslim hatred 
of Sukarno and his chief supporters, the communist party (PKI) was great, 
and perhaps this was why Muslims were active in helping the New Order 
demolish the Old Order.
After Sukarno, the second president, Suharto and his New Order, was 
also widely known for an emphasis on ‘unity’. Because the Javanese ethnic-
ity was dominant, the government attempted to homogenize the nation and 
create a common culture with symbols and values based on Javanese cultural 
style and values, thus inciting bitter indignation on the part of the Outer 
Islanders. For them nationalism was merely Javanization as part of the 
hegemonization policy of the ruler in Jakarta. Beginning in 1978, a national 
indoctrination programme, P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila) was undertaken to inculcate the values of Pancasila into all citi-
zens, especially schoolchildren and civil servants. Pancasila as an expression 
of nationalism was now used as an instrument of social and political control. 
Further, the regime stipulated an azas tunggal (a ‘single ideological founda-
tion’) policy which obliged all associations (including the Ulama Council, 
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Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) to be based on Pancasila and nothing else 
(see Bruinessen 2013). Budiman (2014: 194–8) shows that the concept of 
a unitary state, which implies that the government prioritises the preser-
vation of political sovereignty, often advanced at the expense of diversity 
of language, ethnic, local differences, indigenous normative ordering, and 
religious law. He also highlights three political instruments that the govern-
ment invented, which, in my view, planted the seeds for the legitimation of 
intolerance in dealing with diversity in the future. They are:
1) Forcing unity onto diversity, whereby a homogenization policy was 
accompanied by rhetoric and practices that restricted diversity in terms 
of both political and ethno-cultural pluralism. 
2) The standardization of ethno-cultural diversity, whereby diversity was 
encouraged, not as recognition of differences, but as a means of promot-
ing economics of the state’s tourism project.
3) The stipulation of ‘official religions’ whereby only five were acknowl-
edged by the state (Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Hinduism, Buddhism). 
For Indonesia at the time, ‘Islam’ referred only to Sunni orthodoxy.6 
When fixed features are adopted as defining features of the nation, a 
potential problem of hierarchy emerges. Conflicts between the Sunni 
major ity and the nascent presence of Ahmadi and Shi’ite minority groups 
emanated from those. 
Down to this day, Indonesian political figures continued to claim that 
Indonesia is a microcosm of the world’s diversity (Alles 2016: 140): ‘If, and 
when Indonesians will succeed as a nation, we will have to be optimistic 
on the fact that peace and harmony can be possible in every corner of the 
world’, and Pancasila has always been glorified as the ‘secret recipe’ of its 
success story:
Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika [‘Unity in Diversity’, Indonesia’s 
national motto] can be a model for future relations between various 
religions and civilizations. Our experience with Pancasila demonstrates 
that it was the right choice (Alles 2016: 140).
6 The Shafi’i school remains dominant throughout Southeast Asia today.
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Moreover, Pancasila is believed to be the solution that provides rooms for 
interreligious dialogue between Islam and Christianity: 
Pancasila is the only viable alternative if Indonesia is to maintain its 
unity and its diversity. In dealing with the two conflicting ideologies, 
the solution offered by Pancasila is that Indonesia would be neither 
a secular state, where religion is absolutely separated by the state, nor 
religious one, where the state is organized based on particular faith. In 
short, both Pancasila and ‘secularization as differentiation’ allow us to 
avoid choosing between a secular and a narrowly religious state. (Intan 
2006: 18)
Nevertheless, this article would like to point out that in reality the history 
of Indonesia is characterized by religious warfare, interreligious conflicts, 
and political-religious divergences (see, e.g., Pringle 2010, Ricklefs et al. 
2010, Bruinessen 2013). Beginning from the end of the twentieth century, 
Indonesia has been afflicted by massive ethnic and religious conflicts – gen-
erally motivated by religious hatred between Muslims and Christians. My 
investigation of the roots of the hatred suggests three main causal events:
Firstly, the legacy of the colonial system produced largely marginalized, 
pious Muslim groups, already mentioned. 
Secondly, as the country had constantly been threatened by internal 
clashes along both ideological and regional fault lines, a fear of disintegra-
tion was nurtured. With the history of the tensions between Islam and secu-
lar nationalism that continued to plague the nation, Islam was identified as 
an ‘internal enemy’.
Thirdly, bitter indignation was connected to a dispute over ‘seven words’ 
which were dropped from the first principle of Pancasila. This incident sug-
gests an inherent problem of coexistence between Christians and Muslims 
in ex-colonized societies, inferred from previous discussion about secular-
ization and the missionaries in the colonies. More elaborate discussion is 
provided in section ‘Celebrating diversity’. To highlight the point of dis-
putes, the following section presents a chronological outline of the events 
concerned with nation building and the development of Pancasila from two 
opposing viewpoints – of the Muslims and of the Christians respectively. 
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The ‘seven words’ that never went away
Pancasila was developed in the final days of the Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia (1942–5), forged by nationalists to create a social contract among 
the citizens of the future nation of Indonesia. A federation of Muslims, 
Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia; the Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims), was established with sponsorship from the Japanese 
military authorities and was explicitly created to support the Japanese in 
World War 2. On March 1, 1945, the Japanese established an Investigating 
Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) 
in order to draft a constitution. The representatives of Masyumi were present 
on the committee alongside secular and Christian nationalists. A draft ver-
sion of the future state ideology, Pancasila, was signed on 22 June 1945, as 
the Jakarta Charter by the future president, Sukarno, the future vice presi-
dent, Hatta, and others, including seven Muslim politicians as the repre-
sentatives of Masyumi. On August 17, 1945, the independence of Indonesia 
was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta. One day after the proclam-
ation, seven of the words on the first principle (sila) of Pancasila stipulated 
in the Jakarta Charter (signed two months earlier), disappeared. In the char-
ter it was specified as ‘belief in God with obligation for adherents of Islam 
to carry out Sharia (Islamic Law)’, but in the constitution proclaimed on 
18 August 1945 it was altered to the simple ‘belief in God’. The intrigues 
operating behind the incident were complex. 
From the Christians’ viewpoint, the original sila seemed to imply that the 
state would be responsible for implementing this provision, and would thus 
be some sort of quasi-Islamic state: 
From the beginning the Christians took part fully in the process of 
formulating the Pancasila or the Five Principles of statehood. It was 
primarily a result of Christian insistence that there should be no 
discrimina tory treatment of any group that seven words in the original 
draft of the preamble of the constitution, which would have made it 
imperative for Muslims to abide by the Shariah, were dropped a few 
hours before the ratification of the constitution on 18 August 1945. 
Without much theological reflection, the Christians in Indonesia 
from 1945 on were protagonists of equal rights for all citizens, irre-
spective of creed, race and ethnic origin, as expressed in the Pancasila. 
(Simatupang 1985: 81)
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They [Christians] insisted on a revision of the Jakarta Charter by delet-
ing the seven words that gave advantage to Islam; without this they 
would stand outside of the Republic of Indonesia. Ngelow argues that 
the removal of the seven words of Jakarta Charter was the Christian 
contribution defending the nation’s unity and constituted an ahistorical 
moment in which Christians played an important role in the political 
arena. (Setyawan 2014: 101)
When the second term of the BPUPKI plenary sessions was held in 
mid July 1945, some of the members, including Johannes Latuharhary 
from the Christian faction, expressed their objection to the seven-word 
clause. He warned that the clause would place the other religions in 
serious danger and would bring disorder to the people’s customs in 
regions such as Minangkabau and Maluku; meanwhile the Islamic fac-
tion argued that it would not cause any danger or disorder. After an 
endless debate the sessions were closed without any clear agreement or 
consensus. Sukarno closed the debate by recalling that the controversial 
clause was a compromise between the Islamic and the nationalist fac-
tions. On this basis he appealed that the main points in the Preamble 
be accepted. … Soekarno once again appealed … ‘I know that this 
means an enormous sacrifice, very especially from the patriotic brothers 
Latuharhary and Maramis who are not Muslim. I beg with a weeping 
heart that you are willing to make this offer to our country and nation, 
a sacrifice for our desire that we can solve this quickly so that the inde-
pendent Indonesia can be quickly in peace’. (Aritonang and Steenbrink 
2008: 189)
It was reported that one day after the proclamation of independence, on 
17 August 1945, the Japanese Navy intervened, claiming that Christians in 
its area of responsibility, eastern Indonesia, would separate themselves if the 
seven words were not deleted (Pringle 2010: 69; Aritonang and Steenbrink 
2008: 189). 
As a matter of fact, the seven words do not mention an ‘Islamic state’. 
They merely say that Muslims, not anyone else, would be bound by the tenets 
of Sharia law. This situation in particular, recalls Karen Armstrong’s opinion 
about secularization and the colonized people. Armstrong points out that 
in Europe, secularization emerged at a time when Europe was beginning 
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to colonize, and because of that, that came to exert considerable influence 
on the way the West viewed what it had colonized. Accordingly, the secular 
ideology cultivated by European colonizers – which, in Indonesia’s case was 
adopted by the Christians and the secular nationalists – ‘perceives Muslim 
societies that seem incapable of separating faith from politics to be irredeem-
ably flawed’ (Armstrong 2014b). Finally, the ‘seven words’ were aborted in 
response to objections by Indonesian Christians. For Indonesian Muslims, 
on the other hand, the loss of those seven words has stripped Pancasila bare 
of its spiritual meaning. The incident has been and continues to be a defini-
tive sore point in the memory of conservative Muslims concerning secular 
and Christian groups altogether. Down the years, as the country’s develop-
ment has only brought about a wider gap between the well-off Christian 
minority and the deprived Muslim majority (see, e.g., The Guardian 2017), 
Pancasila has once again become a bone of contention and the dispute over 
the ‘seven words’ has resurfaced. The state’s inability to bring about prosper-
ity has put Pancasila into competition with religious ideologies (Sulaiman 
2011). Above all, from the conservative Muslims’ viewpoint (as of Islamists 
generally), an obedience to a purely secular Pancasila is always an act of 
going into partnership with God (shirk) – the greatest sin in Islam. Thus, 
Pancasila is regarded as a taghut.7 In the light of this incident, Yusuf al-
Qaradawi’s statement (March 2014: 293) is pertinent. Qaradawi contends 
that secularism could be more easily accepted in a Christian society due to 
the fact that ‘Christianity is devoid of a shari’a or a comprehensive system of 
life to which its adherents should be committed’. He says further:
The New Testament itself divides life into two parts, one for God, or 
religion, the other for Caesar, or the state: ‘Render unto Caesar things 
which belong to Caesar, and render unto God things which belong to 
God (Matthew 22:21). As such, a Christian could accept secularism 
without any qualms of conscience’. (March 2014: 293)
The ‘seven words’ continued to be a painful reminder of Muslim’s defeat. 
From that time on, Muslim–Christian relations turned from bad to worse. 
7 Taghut refers to idolatry or to the worship of anything other than Allah.
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Perplexed and assured
Despite all attempts to achieve a ‘unity’ at the national level, ethnic and 
religious conflicts continued to recur in Indonesia. Contemporary Indonesian 
society, after all, is characterized by a pervasive fragmentation that Edward 
Aspinall (2013) argues is associated with neoliberalism. According to his 
observation, fragmentation is visible virtually everywhere, with new or 
revivified local identities based on ethnicity and religion and with various 
forms of cultural revival. Additionally, Aspinall (2010) and Peter Blunt et al. 
(2012) show that contemporary Indonesia remains a society of patronage 
and  patronage remains systemic within the government. Notably, money 
politics and corrupt practices continue to constitute and sustain this patron-
age (Blunt et al. 2012). In a study of environmental governance, Paruedee 
Nguitragool (2012) found a lack of large-scale social cohesion between civil 
society organizations in Indonesia and the public, in conjunction with a frag-
mentation along the axis of class inequality and identity politics. My own 
observation captured two dissimilar opinions widely pervading Indonesian 
minds these days: 
1) In remembrance of the past, people believe that in fact Indonesia needs 
strong authoritarian governments that can keep any kinds of conflicts 
and disunities under control. 
2) Many Indonesian leaders have continued to maintain a confidence that 
Indonesia is an excellent example of a peaceful society, albeit a diverse 
one, which deserves international recognition and admiration. These 
leaders claim, and their political supporters agree, that Pancasila is the 
secret of its success. 
With the key findings of this research, my analysis disproves the first 
belief. The investigation shows, on the contrary, that today’s problems in 
many cases are the legacy of an abusive past. The analysis also disproves the 
second belief, for the findings demonstrate the flawed assumption that a 
state-centric nation building will engender a harmonious society by impos-
ing unity onto diversity. 
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Celebrating diversity: a Quranic perspective
The normative discussion of Islam and secularism in this section and 
the pragmatic approach adopted to deal with the contemporary challenges 
rest on my theoretical and empirical work (Alkatiri 2014, 2016). Being crit-
ical of secularism and the nation state, I beg to differ with many scholars 
from Muslim-majority countries who are ‘frequently called upon to publicly 
proclaim endorsement of Western liberal, democratic institutions’ (March 
2014). 
It is well known that among the world religions, ‘Islam has perhaps the 
most unequivocal claim to a public political vision’ (March 2014: 2828). In 
my opinion, that cannot be fully understood without a hermeneutical under-
standing of the differing concepts of ‘religion’ referred to by the Quran and 
the one understood in the Western tradition. Based on Ibn Manzur’s stand-
ard classic, the Lisan al-Arab (1968), Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas 
(2013) elucidates the concept of religion couched in the term al-din. The 
word din derived from the Arabic root DYN (‘debt’). The primary significa-
tions of the term din can be reduced to four: 1) indebtedness; 2) submissive-
ness; 3) judicious power; 4) natural inclination or tendency (ibid. 2). Man is 
indebted to God for bringing him/her into existence and maintaining him/
her in his/her existence. Being indebted, one is under obligations which 
naturally involve submission. The moment one is created and given exist-
ence, he/she is in a state of utter loss, for everything in him/her is what the 
Creator owns. Being ‘owned’ by the Creator consequently means he/she is 
the slave (abd) of God and should direct his/her true loyalty to God alone. 
As a result, Al-Attas argues that 
The man of Islam is not bound by the social contract, nor does he 
espouse the doctrine of the Social Contract…for he has, nevertheless 
an individual contract reflecting the Covenant his soul has sealed with 
God. (Al-Attas 2013: 25)
 
The act of doing service to God is called ibadah, which refers to ‘all con-
scious and willing acts of service for the sake of God alone and approved by 
Him, including such as are prescribed worship’ (Al-Attas 2013: 11). Thereby, 
the meaning of din is closely associated with ibadah or worship in the man-
ner ‘approved by God’. The latter, in Islam, refers to ‘words and deeds of 
Prophet Muhammad’ termed as the Sunna. 
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In contrast, the term ‘religion’ comes from the Latin religare with the root 
meaning ‘to tie’ or ‘to bind’ – it is what binds humans to God. That word 
suggests a private domain of relationship, devoid of juridical details. For that 
reason, secularism might be embraced more easily within the Western men-
tality, whereas Muslims are bound to struggle with cognitive dissonance, as 
al-Qaradawi argues above. As a comprehensive system of thought and social 
order, Islam, as it is claimed in traditional Islamic lore, consistently sup-
ports religious diversity, and Muslim societies in the Islamic golden age were 
largely tolerant. This confidence is often proffered by conservative Muslims 
to repudiate liberal justifications of secularism as the most appropriate con-
stitutional framework for a complex and morally diverse society. 
Being the youngest of the Abrahamic faiths, Islam has been faced with 
religious diversity since its inception in the seventh century, and thereby has 
a theological basis in relations with other religions. The concept of a cycle of 
prophecy (dairat nubuwwah) according to which the Prophet Muhammad 
is believed to be the last Messenger of God, implies acknowledgement of 
the pre-Islamic religions, and a point of view of diversity as a natural phe-
nomenon in the historical development of religions. Even though Islam 
evaluated pre-Islamic religious traditions critically it never rejected them 
as false (Aydin 2001, Sachedina 2001). Based on the Islamic belief that all 
communities have been visited by a ‘warner’ (Quran 35:24), the recogni-
tion of legitimate religion is not limited to Judaism and Christianity but 
extends to other major pre-Islamic religions.8 Concerning Christianity and 
Judaism, the Quran states that each represents an authentic religious trad-
ition revealed by God (Quran 5:46, 5:48) and it even confirms salvific effi-
cacy within the wider boundaries of monotheism (2:62). Additionally, the 
mention of churches and synagogues along with mosques in the Quran is 
significant in analysing the Islamic view regarding religious diversity (Zia-
Ul-Haq 2010):
8 Sabianism is mentioned in the Quran (5:69, 2:62), and Magianism as well 
(22:17). According to Manazir Ahsan Gilani (Hamidullah 1999: 203), the fol-
lowers of Buddha unanimously believe that Buddha received nirvana for the first 
time under a wild fig tree. Hamidullah considers the mentioning of ‘Fig’ at the 




Had not Allah repulsed the people from one another, ruin would have 
befallen the monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which 
Allah’s Name is mentioned greatly. (Quran 22:40)
In fact, Islam affirms that the core teaching of the communications of 
all prophets and messengers are submission to God (Allah) in the light of 
divine guidance communicated by the prophets. Therefore, all prophets are 
‘Muslims’ (ones who submit to God), and God has repeatedly prohibited 
making a distinction between them (Quran 2:136, 2:285, 3:84).
The prophet Muhammad himself established in Medina the political 
space that gave freedom to practise one’s own faith and pursue social justice 
as well as enjoy equality, brotherhood and the preservation of human dignity. 
This model has historically paved the way for maintaining balance and har-
mony among followers of different faiths in the Islamic world. Consequently, 
religious pluralism in Islam is not simply a matter of accommodating com-
peting claims of religious truth in the private domain of individual faith, but 
a matter of public policy in which an Islamic government must acknowledge 
and protect the divinely-ordained right of each person to determine his/her 
spiritual destiny without coercion. The Quran declares explicitly that there is 
no compulsion in religion (Quran 2:256). From this verse, it can be inferred 
that Islam considers religious diversity as a concomitant of God’s bestowal 
of free will and choice on human beings (Zia-Ul-Haq 2010). The rationale 
is buttressed further by a thought-provoking verse: ‘And if your Lord had 
willed, He could have made mankind one community; but they will not 
cease to differ’ (Quran 11:118).
Correspondingly, if God himself did not force people to embrace a 
‘unity’, it is difficult to argue that it might be permissible for human beings 
to do so. Even to the extent of the kufr (‘those who disbelieve Allah and 
Prophet Muhammad’), Islam teaches to let it go: ‘(say) to you your religion 
and to me mine’ (Quran 109:6) which implies respect for the human right 
to have different opinions.
By contrast, historically, as soon as the Portuguese and Spaniards arrived 
in the Indonesian archipelago in 1511, Christianity was propagated aggres-
sively (Ricklefs et al. 2010). On the other hand, encounters with Islam since 
the seventh century have notably not been followed by conversion. Professor 
A. H. Johns (see ibid. 78–9) attempted to explain why the local people only 
began converting to Islam several centuries after traders had been travelling 
through Southeast Asia. He speculated that it was not until the emergence 
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of Sufism as a dominant stream of Islamic faith throughout the Muslim 
world from the thirteenth century that the locals, whose religions before the 
coming of Islam were characterized by the mystical doctrines of Hinduism 
and Buddhism, might have been attracted to this new faith if it, too, was 
presented in a mystical form. Likewise, Richard K. Khuri (2001) reminds 
us that it took six centuries for the population in the Near East to shift 
from its Christian majority to one that is Muslim. These examples show that 
Muslims by and large did not resort to forced conversions. 
Inventing the future with popular participation
In view of what has been presented concerning Indonesia, grouping and 
the creation of multiplicity seem to be intrinsic to human nature, and thus, 
seeking unity in diversity might be a chimerical dream. In the light of this, 
the act of forcing unity onto diversity – even for the pursuance of equality 
– can be paradoxical, for it necessarily denounces differences and hence the 
promotion of intolerance. Correspondingly, this article debunks Samuel P. 
Huntington’s (1996) premise that diversity necessarily tends to lead to con-
flict. Indonesia reveals that culture and religion did not appear as a single fac-
tor in the conflicts; it is the ‘desire to control’ that manifested in ‘forcing unity 
onto diversity’ which was the major cause. Accordingly, from this perspec-
tive, Huntington’s proposition appears as a ‘power-trip’ – namely, an expres-
sion of ‘fear of losing control’. Along this line of argument, the state-centric 
nation-building process should be held responsible for widespread intoler-
ance in present-day Indonesia, for it has cultivated vigilance against differ-
ences between people in the population. Besides, the history of Christianity 
as the ‘religious arm’ of colonial power in Indonesia and the West’s continued 
domination of the Muslim world subsequently have tainted the Muslims’ 
sociological dimension of an ‘Islamic’ knowledge, meaning, action, and real-
ity (Alkatiri 2014)9 concerning the ‘Christian West’. That being the case, 
9 Drawing on Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) symbolic uni-
verse premise, I developed (2014) a theoretical framework to distinguish the 
‘sociologic al’ from the ‘philosophical’ dimensions of religious knowledge, mean-
ing, action, and reality. The former refers to the shared ideas, meanings, values, 
perceptions, and motivations stemming from religious doctrines that have been 
interpreted through the lens of histories of particular human collective interac-
tions with ‘the others’, whereas the latter is the ‘purely’ intellectual and spiritual 
dimension of the religion.
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history accounts for the devastation of Muslim-Christian relations despite 
the Quranic injunctions on the matter. Moreover, in the period we are living 
in, postmodernism confirms the general Muslim sense of feeling oppressed 
by a Western-led, neoliberal, corporate-run globalization process ( Johnston 
2010). Postmodernism as a hodge-podge of social movements and currents 
of thought in revolt against the certainties of the Western Enlightenment 
project dampens modernity’s optimism and rad ically questions (even rejects) 
the Enlightenment’s view of history as a unitary human march toward pro-
gress. It also rejects Enlightenment rationalism, which raises afresh the fun-
damental questions of epistemology, ontology, and hermeneutics. Notably, 
postmodernism often takes on radical political stances, as with Foucault’s 
denouncement of the power dimension behind knowledge/discourse. These 
premises are central in my thesis (Alkatiri 2016), which concerns the rela-
tionship between science, technology, economic growth and ‘power’ in the 
post-colonial world and the Muslim’s context. 
The die was cast and the old cleavages have inevitably often justified mis-
trust and violence. Against this long-standing ‘West-Islam divide’ and the 
backdrop of the global ecological crisis that ironically calls for a global col-
laboration to tackle the problems, David Joseph Wellman (2004) contends 
that what is needed is a ‘sustainable diplomacy’ through a ‘people-to-people’ 
approach that moves beyond the rigidity of a state system. In environmental 
studies generally, the concept of the nation state has been critically revis-
ited, since national sovereignty consistently stands in the way of creating 
an international framework for collective actions (e.g. Speth 2002, Park et 
al. 2008, Stern 2006, Alkatiri 2014). This recalls Arnold Toynbee’s (1976) 
prediction:
The present-day global set of local sovereign states is … not capable of 
saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of conserving the 
biosphere’s non-replaceable natural resources. … Will mankind murder 
Mother Earth or will he redeem her? This is the enigmatic question 
which now confronts Man. (Toynbee 1976: 593–6) 
Wellman’s ‘sustainable diplomacy’ values the role of popular religions 
alongside ecological histories and the consumption-waste pattern in the 
society. I analyse the potential to capitalize on the Islamic ‘symbolic universe’ 
to instigate sweeping socio-ecological actions in the Muslim world (Alkatiri 
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2014). In a similar vein, Johnston (2010) seeks to construct a Muslim-
Christian theological discourse on creation and humanity that could help 
adherents of both faiths work together to preserve our planet. 
To you be your way, and to me mine
Against the background of complex developmental/environmental 
problems and widespread poverty in Indonesia, my thesis (Alkatiri 2016) 
analyses the ‘centralist vs. decentralist’ debates in ecological politics (e.g. 
Radcliffe 2000). The centralists propose ‘centralized expert government’ and 
a largely authoritarian society including intellectual controls over citizens 
and oligarchical systems, for they do not see the present democratic insti-
tutions and economic structure as being able to cope with the ecological 
crisis. Conversely, the decentralists hold that the more severe the problem 
the more difficult it would be for a centralist and authoritarian group to 
manage, and hence decentralization is inevitable. The political organization 
along decentralist lines is increasingly perceived to be ‘practical and desirable 
by activists in areas of politics which may not have as their original aim an 
ecological society’ (Allaby 1977: 244). The ‘relocalisation’ model mentioned 
in the introduction of this article is a decentralist approach which I found 
to be practical and operable for Indonesian Muslim groups to espouse. 
‘Relocalisation’ is a non-state-centric community movement in response to 
dominant economic policies that ignore the needs of people and the planet. 
Its primary aim is to reduce local un-sustainability as much as possible and 
enhance local resilience, rather than engage in much wider political projects 
(Barry 2012). 
Relocalisation ideals are inspired by a Western thinker, E. F. Schumacher, 
who himself was inspired by local Asian communities in his well-known 
Small is Beautiful (1973). The Gandhian ideal of ‘no affluence no poverty’ 
has been one of the movement’s fundamental principles. The movements 
believe that these smaller-scale communities nurture more intimate rela-
tions among people and ensure that everyone is seen, heard and recognized 
– thus providing a sense of individual identity that is lacking in the ano-
nymity and isolation of mass society (Maser 1997, Norberg-Hodge 2002). 
Norberg argues further that when people live in smaller-scale social and 
economic units, where mutual support is necessary, the human capacity for 
caring and kindness is enhanced. In the relocalisation discourse, ecovillages 
provide models for living close to the land and in community with one 
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another – a vision that is inspiring for the increasing numbers of people 
who long to live in a way that is spiritually rewarding as well as ecologically 
sustainable. The relocalisation activists believe that all good intentions and 
sophisticated analyses of global problems and solutions by academics, polit-
icians, think tanks and concerned lay people mean nothing until, and unless, 
individual citizens take personal action to change their lifestyles. 
Under the circumstances of the changing global environment, this article 
aims to further the call for popular participation and collaborative action, 
hence, the need for social arrangements that could best serve the intrin-
sic nature of humans characterized by diversity, whereby grouping and cre-
ating multiplicities are deemed inevitable. Accordingly, it came up with a 
faith-based ‘relocalisation’ model for the Islamic community movement that 
allows Muslims from diverse forms of Islam to maintain their differences, 
implement what they ‘believe’, and exercise their visions of ‘Islamic’ societies 
within their own communities’ jurisdictions. Neither secular nation states, 
nor ‘Islamic states’ in the modern sense of the term, could serve the diversity, 
self-sufficiency, self-local governance, and genuine creativities that such a 
scheme needs. Therefore, I contend the ‘minimal’ or ‘night-watchman’ states 
to be the most apposite.
A minimal or night-watchman state is a form of government in political 
philosophy where the state’s legitimate function is only the protection of the 
individual from assault, theft, breach of contract, or fraud. Citizens are free 
to choose any social arrangements (see, e.g., Nozick 2013). The advocates of 
this school are called minarchists. They argue that the state has no rights to 
use its force to interfere with transactions between people. The only legitim-
ate governmental institutions are the military, police and courts. In the light 
of pressing socio-ecological issues and the ‘relocalisation’ model as a possible 
and operable solution at community levels, and secondly, the potential of 
faith-based environmental movements (see, e.g., Alkatiri 2014, 2016), the 
minimal or night-watchman state is the most suitable type of state in the 
Anthropocene epoch,10 for it allows a life of creativity that liberates people 
to freely choose their own social arrangements without the need to abide by 
a single-state ideology for the whole nation. My proposition corresponds 
with Wael B. Hallaq’s (2012) The Impossible State. According to Hallaq, the 
modern state is incompatible with, if not altogether contradictory to, the 
10 The period in which human activities became the primary driver of global eco-
logical change.
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concept of the state in Islam. Given that the state in the Islamic sense should 
be organized organically around the centre of God’s sovereignty, the weaker 
or more minimal the state, the more compatible it is with Islam. The follow-
ing section provides an example of an intentional community model already 
undertaken endogenously by the Hidayatullah group in Indonesia that is 
worth considering in contemplating ‘relocalisation’ within a minimal state. 
The khilafah reinterpreted: a case study
What follows is a brief ethnographic account of the Hidayatullah 
pesantren11 learning community network in Indonesia. The fieldwork was 
conducted in the mother pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, hav-
ing two ‘campuses’. A ‘campus’, for the Hidayatullah, is an enclave com-
posed of schools, a mosque, a housing complex and a student dormitory. 
The first one in Balikpapan has been extended to include a reforested wood, 
a community garden, a large pond, a self-managed water facility and pasar 
umi (‘mum’s market’), selling household groceries. Campus 1 is located in 
Gunung Tembak, East Balikpapan, with an area of 200 hectares and a little 
more than a fifteen hundred inhabitants. When I visited, for this research, 
Campus 2, within sight of the gate of Campus 1, was under construction. 
Balikpapan is a seaport city on the east coast island of Kalimantan (Borneo). 
It is a resource-rich region known for timber and petroleum export prod-
ucts, and was once famous as Indonesia’s ‘oil city’. 
The Hidayatullah community evokes a reinterpretation of the khilafah.12 
In fact, by subscribing to the ideals of the khilafah, the community has not 
been burdened by the demands of ‘nationalism’ and the nation-state system, 
hence, they have been able to gain greater control over their members’ des-
tinies through the community development enterprise. The ‘clash of a sym-
bolic universe’ (see Alkatiri 2016)13 and the Islamic utopia of the Medina 
society that had plagued the state-Muslim relations appeared as the main 
11 Pesantren is a home-grown traditional Islamic institute in Indonesia. 
12 The caliphate, the first system of governance established in Islam. It is believed to 
be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic Ummah. It is worth noting that khilafah 
was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam emphasizes a direct link 
between man and God (ittisal).
13 My thesis provides a historical narrative behind the formation of the community 
and ethnographic accounts that illustrate the meaning of the community for the 
leaders and the recruits.
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themes behind the formation of Hidayatullah. In contrast to green inten-
tional communities in the West, it is worth highlighting that Hidayatullah 
was not designed on the basis of ecological utopian principles and tech-
niques embraced by, for instance, the ‘ecovillages’ discussed earlier. They did 
not intend to develop ‘closed-loop, symbiotic, self-sustaining human habi-
tats and production systems that do not result in ecological de gradation and 
social injustice’ (Lockyer and Veteto 2013). Nonetheless, as the community 
members reduce their dependence on the global economy and replace it 
with household and local economies, they have reduced the demand that 
drives current inequities. After all, it should be borne in mind that the eco-
logical-utopian principles and techniques seek, essentially, to enable people 
to become more self-reliant, and in the process, relieve the social injustices 
and ecological degradation created by the global political economy. In a 
broader sense, Hidayatullah was developed upon the basis of a combination 
of the following:
1) The search for similarity and like-mindedness outside the Indonesian 
mainstream Islamic communities represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah;
2) A yearning for close-knit ties of village communities, security, and the 
camaraderie of a large family;
3) Parents’ concerns over their children’s encounters with un-Islamic 
influ ences;
4) The leaders’ political instincts to circumvent those hardships through 
the creation of their own space for self-governance, and by doing so, 
ignoring the state and the dominant political-economic order that it 
encompasses.
The Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan attracts people to join their 
activities although they do not necessarily become active members, or cadre, 
to be assigned to assume tasks in other branches. I came to know a lady, 
Rahima (whose name has been changed), who, together with her husband, 
joined Hidayatullah’s activities for a number of years. Rahima’s husband was 
a professional in an oil company in Balikpapan, and he had recently passed 
away when she was being interviewed.
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I decided to live inside the Hidayatullah campus in order to give my 
two sons a good Islamic neighbourhood and to have a ‘village’ for 
myself to settle down in for the rest of my life. It’s really hard to raise 
children in the cities as you know the influences are so bad. My big son 
has been studying in another pesantren outside Balikpapan and my late 
husband wanted our little son to be a hafiz (a person who memorizes 
the Quran completely), he seems able to do so, so we put him here.
While all properties in Campus 1 were owned by the organization, 
Campus 2, which was under construction was intended to be purchased by 
the members on condition that it may not be transferred to anyone without 
the prior consent of the Hidayatullah. The condition was made in order to 
keep the campus inhabited by the members only. The price of the land was 
quite low. Rahima bought a plot of land, more or less 300m2, and built a 
house with a vegetable garden at the back.
Fieldwork was also conducted at the Depok campus near Jakarta. It was 
built in 1991. Here the organization was not able to obtain a larger plot of 
land than the existing three hectares. Therefore, not every member was given 
a chance to live inside the enclave. There were some individuals who could 
afford to buy a piece of land adjacent to it and it was intended that the com-
plex would expand gradually. It was a very troublesome journey negotiating 
traffic and tricky roads to the location which was on the farthest outskirts 
of Jakarta city. Shodiq, a member, had been living in the complex for fif-
teen years. He came from a nominal Muslim family farming background 
in Central Java. Both Shodiq and his wife had worked full-time to serve 
the schools and the students’ dormitory and receive in-kind remuneration 
instead of salary. 
We live within a very small economy. We trust in God though, that 
His hand will always be extended to us whenever we need help. As 
you see we don’t live like people out there; we don’t have to have a TV 
and luxury stuff like them. We feel secure because we know that our 
children will be taken care of. In our network we have schools from 
kindergarten to university. For anyone who has tasted the life of being 
anonymous out there they will agree that it is a lot easier to man-
age your family if you live in a community where everyone helps and 




The feeling of being in a large family is wonderful here, considering 
we’re not related familially. Let me give you one example; my friends 
will give you more. My wife was advised by the doctor to give birth by 
caesarian. I was so shocked, how could I afford the surgery? [titter]. But 
it was done in the end, paid jointly by everyone. So, there’s no shortage 
in here, insyaAllah.
Because we perform prayer in the congregation, the sense of together-
ness is maintained. If we have a problem, we share it with one another.
Because we are like-minded, we can let our children play and make 
friends freely without being worried.
One of Hidayatullah’s values is an insistence on the five-times-a-day 
prayer being conducted in the congregation (jama’ah) for those males who 
at the time of prayer happen to be around the campus. They believe it to be 
the most effective method of maintaining social capital among them. 
Male and female focus group discussions gave identical answers to 
Shodiq and Ikhwan’s reasoning for living in the Hidayatullah communities. 
It is interesting to note that among members living in the Depok campus 
were men who worked in government offices, and their wives served the 
Hidayatullah schools. Clearly all the people of Hidayatullah rank commu-
nity living at the highest level of importance. They see small-scale commu-
nities like the ones they have established and networked, as a manifestation 
of the khilafah. Syaikhul at the Jakarta head office said:
We’re not the ones who got frustrated because khilafah Islamiyah is not 
there, we still can have it by ourselves, on a small scale.
The members can make a living outside the Hidayatullah, but when 
they are going home they are going to the community.
And, Suharsono in Jakarta head office:
What we are doing is in accordance with the Prophet’s saying, that 
every collectivity must have a leader, ‘When three men travel together, 
they should make one of them a leader’.
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Hidayatullah has stated explicitly that rebuilding Islamic civilization is 
its vision. In its notary act of establishment, the organization was officially 
defined as a mass organization and referred to as an Islamic movement. 
Further, it was meant to be a medium for the holy struggle (jihad) and tak-
ing jihad as an injunction for all Muslims on board, individually (infiradi) 
and collectively (jama’i). The Hidayatullah members’ families were proud 
to be families of mujahid (those who are engaged in jihad). Slogans such 
as ‘Indahnya menjadi keluarga mujahid’ (‘it’s great to be mujahid family’) are 
commonplace in this community. 
The alumni of Hidayatullah rapidly produced a network. While initially 
the members were mainly from the Bugis ethnic diaspora, over the years 
they have become increasingly diverse. The network is managed by means of 
a system of organization with clearly defined criteria of zones, regions and 
areas for its branches. The male members in a focus group recalled the vision 
of Abdullah Said, the founder, for a model of Islamic society in Indonesia.
He said we wanted to make a place so that when people come to visit 
and observe, they can tell what Islam is like, that Islam is beautiful 
[mutter] – that sounds like the title of Trans TV programme by Ustadz 
Maulana, Islam is Beautiful.
Zainuddin Musaddad, the head of pesantren, quipped: ‘beautiful in story!’ 
and the rest of them laughed, 
Well, yes, that’s how the Muslim attitude is today, they only tell about 
Islam, that Islam is beautiful – but only in story, ‘No-Action-Talk-
Only’.
They articulated the bitter feelings they experienced as a consequence 
of the state’s persistent attempts to discourage Muslim organizations from 
engaging in politics and to stick to purely religious pursuits. Due to per-
ceived ties with the Darul Islam rebellion, Hidayatullah continued to be 
counted as a potential threat. The ICG (International Crisis Group) report 
(2003) on terrorism in Indonesia, and Solahudin (2013), identified Darul 
Islam as the origin of the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist underground network 
in Southeast Asia. According to John T. Sidel (2007), in order to appreciate 
the broader context of Islamist activities and influence in Southeast Asia, 
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it is essential to understand the ways in which European and American 
colonial rule created lasting obstacles to the promotion of Islamist politics 
in Southeast Asia. Sidel argues that coverage of terrorist events in Southeast 
Asia focuses on description, rather than explanation, events, rather than 
causes. Furthermore, scholarship on Southeast Asian terrorism relies too 
much on official sources from the security services, which could have a pro-
fessional interest in exaggerating the danger. Also, several individuals in 
Southeast Asian security apparatuses have personal and ideological reasons 
for not telling the truth. 
In sum, I found two social phenomena in the Hidayatullah community 
in Balikpapan that made it seem like an appropriate medium for change 
towards sustainability principles. One is an image taken from a vision of 
Erich Fromm’s ‘community of being’ rather than a ‘community of having’ 
in the context of debates over sustainable lifestyle. The other is Hannah 
Arendt’s vita activa (de Geus 2009: 91). Erich Fromm’s work on ‘having 
and being’ as two fundamental human orientations toward the self and the 
world posits that
… in a less high-level consumption society the overall emphasis will 
not be on the outward characteristics of status and success, but on the 
inward aspect of human well-being. One can think of relaxation, bal-
ance, a focus on and attention for our fellow-beings (human and non-
human), the enjoyment of pleasant and meaningful work, contributing 
to the community, but also the importance of the spiritual, just to be 
and exist in a dignified, relaxed and elegant way, instead of constantly 
being eager to accumulate possessions of whatever kind. (De Geus 
2009: 91)
The Hidayatullah community also displayed a balanced configuration of 
Hannah Arendt’s vita activa as described in her work entitled The Human 
Condition (Arendt 1985). 
The premise of vita activa provides explanations for the formation, devel-
opment and stability of community despite challenges on all fronts. Hannah 
Arendt argues that there are three fundamental human activities: labour, 
work and action. Labour is the activity that is linked to the biological process 
of the human body and the satisfaction of direct physical needs, like the pro-
vision of food and drink. Work is the activity that creates an artificial world 
of enduring objects, to provide a stable living environment for humans. 
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Action corresponds to the fundamental human condition of plurality and is 
directed at the creation of a public sphere in which people can enjoy political 
freedom (Arendt 1985: 7, 50–4). Arendt contends that while action was of 
the highest significance in ranking in the Greek ‘polis’ (followed by work and 
finally labour), in modern times the hierarchy has been completely reversed. 
Political changes resulting in the systematic loss of so-called spaces of polit-
ical action and the loss of distinction between the private and public realms 
have contributed to this reversal. Nowadays, the value of labour and the pro-
duction of consumption goods are consistently overrated, whereas the value 
of the more meaningful activities of acting in the public realm and creat-
ing lasting products have almost disappeared (ibid. 294–305). Arendt argues 
that in our era the goal of human activity (vita activa) is no longer to be 
found in sustaining a public sphere of political action or in creative work, but 
in routine labour, growing economic welfare, abundance and mass consump-
tion. Nowadays, increasing wealth and the greatest consumer happiness of 
the greatest number are the basic aims of social and political life (ibid. 133). 
In fact, unlike lay people in Indonesian society at large, Hidayatullah 
members have managed to undertake not only labour and work according to 
Arendt’s definitions, but also action in terms of more meaningful activities in 
the public realm. By doing so, they have been living, indeed, in the ‘imagined 
Darul Islam’ which has then been reified. Even though they, too, have had to 
contend with growing problems in the Indonesian society at large, my obser-
vation of the two communities in Balikpapan and Depok, Jakarta, suggests 
that the institution is remarkably well and alive. In general, the communities 
have greater control over their own destinies compared to the larger society 
of Indonesia. In that respect, it is worth mentioning that in the focus group 
discussion with the male leaders in Jakarta, a flippant, jocular answer to my 
question regarding what their opinion about the multi-dimensional crisis 
in Indonesia was: ‘That’s true, but that’s Indonesia, our neighbour [laugh-
ter].’ As they created their own space for self-governance they felt they did 
not need to concern themselves too much with the state and the domin-
ant political-economic order that circumscribes it. In addition, due to the 
fact that they were in a position of having to provide nearly everything by 
themselves with very limited funding, I observed everyone, men and women 
including the youth, always engaged in providing various kinds of public 
services to the community such as cleaning, gardening, building work, cut-
ting wood for construction, maintenance and so forth, besides managing 
schools and the everyday needs of the students living in the dormitories. 
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Also, regular halaqah (learning circles) were being conducted in which some 
of the leaders were the murabbi14 educators. A sense of connection with the 
other Hidayatullah members in different places seemed to have been well 
maintained by means of regular meetings held regionally or nationally, rang-
ing from every three months to yearly, then to five-yearly, depending on the 
scope of the assembly. 
Within its women’s division, Mushida (Muslimah Hidayatullah), the 
women enjoyed equal opportunities for being active in public life as well 
as maintaining connections through the equally regular women’s meetings. 
Besides being a school provider, Hidayatullah has been active in human-
itarian work as well. They engage with other Muslim groups, national and 
international, in disaster relief activities. There are two sources of funding 
indicated by the leaders, namely, economic activities and zakat. Baitul Maal 
Hidayatullah (see their website) is the financial institution they founded to 
manage their funds. Economic activities of the organization include char-
itable businesses such as schools, and profit-making businesses such as a 
palm-oil plantation, a supermarket and many small-scale entrepreneurial 
undertakings.
It is all too easy to ridicule the Islamists and their utopian movement 
as ‘dangerous’. Their movement often evokes negative associations with 
irrationality and a futile adherence to the past. In my research for realistic 
and practical solutions, I consider the Islamic utopia of the Medina society 
to be comparable to any other utopian imaginary that has inspired green 
intentional community movements in the West. Instead of seeing it as a 
daydream, a romantic and unattainable fantasy, it is the inspirational side 
of utopias that needs to be justly considered. The Medina society, afore-
mentioned in the discussion about religious diversity in section ‘Celebrating 
diversity’, is believed by Muslims to be the most perfect Islamic society, a 
society according to which all other Islamic societies are ‘judged’. Medina, 
the city where the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic political 
entity, recognizes religious, social, and cultural plurality among its citizens. 
This has been taken as a model set by the Prophet to reify Islam as a com-
plete system governing all religious, social, political, cultural and economic 
orders, and encompassing all things material, spiritual, societal, individual, 
and personal. Interest in the Medina society has continuously revived among 
14 Trainer in personalized education.
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Muslim communities whenever they face issues of a plurality of religion, 
Islamic politics and governance, and justice. 
Nonetheless, apropos of the night-watchman state and ‘relocalisation’, 
which  have been propounded as a possible scheme for the future, it is neces-
sary to recognize the downside of the ‘exclusive’ nature of the like-minded 
intentional community. With that in mind, it is important to explore in what 
ways dialogical attitudes can be cultivated among the members to nurture 
intercultural communications between Islam and other groups in diverse 
societies. It is also important to explore under what circumstances such uto-
pian movements may resort to violent action which may harm innocent 
others and damage the prospects for realizing the ‘Medina society’ exempli-
fied by the Prophet Muhammad.
Conclusion
This article demonstrates the impossibility of pursing unity, either for 
a distinct nation state or a monolithic Islam. Against the need for popular 
participation in dealing with converging socio-ecological crises in Muslim-
majority countries, this article offers a faith-based ‘relocalisation’ model for 
an Islamic sustainable community movement that allows Muslims from 
diverse interpretations of Islam to maintain their differences, implement 
what they ‘believe’, and exercise their visions of ‘Islamic’ societies within 
their own communities’ jurisdictions. Neither secular nation states, nor 
‘Islamic states’ in the modern sense of the word, could serve the diversity, 
self-sufficiency, local self-governance, and genuine creativity that such a 
scheme needs. Therefore, ‘minimal’ or ‘night-watchman’ states might be the 
most apposite for  the Anthropocene era.
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